Security
Some parts of the system are trusted and some others are not Security modules part of an host that is trusted:
Security modules trust each other (smart card, special microprocessor or co-processor, -> Trusted Computing Group) Tamper-proof hardware and certified software But the environment is not trusted and can act as an adversary Security module With relay and piggy-back of old messages, a in-connected (resp. outconnected) process receives (resp. sends) all messages from (to) correct processes If all crash-correct processes are connected, then omission models are equivalent to crash model.
Consensus:
Each process has an initial value and has to decide (irrevocably): Gives to each process the identity of a process leader process such that:
Eventually all correct processes agree on only one leader forever and this leader is a correct process Ω is the weakest failure detector to solve the consensus
Failure detector
Here, "correct" is a very strong property (for correct processes it is impossible to distinguish between a correct leader and a crash correct that omit to send or receive messages from faulty processes) Ω :
Gives to each process the identity of a leader process such that:
Eventually only one leader forever and this leader is a crash-correct and connected process
Consensus with Ω
With Ω it is possible to solve consensus.
Principles:
Round based: rounds with coordinator. If I trust the coordinator (the coordinator is the leader), I wait for an answer from him and I adopt the value he proposed (phase ONE) Verify that enough people adopts this value and decide or proposes the adopted value for the next round. (if all messages TWO I received have the same value v, then at least a majority of processes sends ( TWO, v) and then every process receives at least one (TWO ,v) as no other v (≠ ⊥) can be sent in phase TWO every process either decides or chooses v as proposed value for the next round. => If I decided v in next rounds only v will be proposed)
